General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB), in his recently launched book, narrated why his childhood friend and long-time colleague, General Mamman Jiya Vatsa was killed and how later’s coup attempt made IBB feel a deep personal sense of betrayal.
He wrote: “What has come to be known as the Vatsa Coup occurred within the first few months of the administration. It began life first as a series of rumours. I heard through multiple sources that my childhood friend and long-time colleague, General Mamman Jiya Vatsa, was planning to topple our young administration in a coup. At first, I dismissed it as the handiwork of people who were envious of the cordial relationship between Vatsa and me over the years.
“I knew, for instance, that many intermediate and senior officers were unhappy that I appointed Gen. Vatsa as Minister of the Federal Capital Territory even though he was not part of the change of government that ousted General Buhari. Yet I remained true to our friendship and bent backwards to accommodate his excesses and boisterousness. Among some of our colleagues and the public, Vatsa became known as the Emperor of Abuja because of his robust boisterousness and love of drama. I admired his passion for poetry and fraternity with the Association of Nigerian Authors.
“Rumours about the impending coup reached me through military intelligence and some officers close to Vatsa. Many were cautionary advice: ‘Sir, be careful with your friend,’ as many informants did not want to be quoted or to come between us as friends.
“I dismissed them at first as mere rumours. Ours is a society in which the power of rumour can overwhelm the reality of facts. Because rumours about happenings in high places tend to be attractive to a mass audience, they tend to gain ground quickly and acquire a life of their own. Unless confronted with the power of facts based on thorough investigation, these rumours repeated and passed around the country tend to become alternative facts. They could have a destructive effect on public sensitivity and perceptions. With our experience in the few months in government and the benefit of hindsight based on previous rumours, I determined that the best way to tackle the rumours about a possible Vatsa coup was by confronting the principal suspects.
“Therefore, when the decibel of the stories rose too high, I confronted Vatsa himself after reporting the rumours to more senior colleagues like Generals Nasko, Garba Duba and Wushishi. Nasko intervened and tried to find out the truth from Vatsa. Vatsa flatly denied it all, but the covert investigations by the military and other intelligence services continued.
“Once substantial incontrovertible evidence was established, the arrests began. It turned out that Vatsa had paid several officers money to facilitate the coup operation. One of them was Lt-Col. Musa Bitiyong, who was given ₦50,000. He admitted it, and Vatsa also admitted the payment but said he wanted to help Bitiyong establish a farm project — the case of Lt-Col. Musa was not helped because he had previously been involved in other controversial coup stories.
“When the coup was first uncovered, I did not quite believe the extent of Vatsa’s involvement. Even worse were the details of the dastardly plans, including plans to bomb the Eko Bridge in Lagos and possibly hijack the presidential jet to eliminate the President.
“As the details kept coming in, it became harder not to believe the integrity of the disclosures. I felt a deep personal sense of betrayal. There were details of conversations, funding, travel itinerary and recruitment of troops to support the operation. Each time I had to be briefed on aspects of the coup plot, I insisted on having a senior officer with integrity present as a witness. I invited Garba Duba to listen in on one occasion as the investigating team briefed me. When I shrugged in disbelief, the briefing officer then revealed that Vatsa had even tried to escape through the wall air conditioner hole in his detention room but was stopped by vigilant guards.
“I had reasons to be shocked at Vatsa’s role, but I was not surprised. We were very close friends. We had grown up together in Minna and had been classmates in Bida. We did several things together as peers. My wife recalled that we used to share a room as bachelors. We would reach out for whatever shirt was available, irrespective of whose it was, and just wear it and head out! We were that close.
“With the benefit of hindsight now, I recall that a constant part of our relationship as teenagers and young men was a continuous and recurrent peer jealousy on his part towards me. He was always envious of my achievements, especially when he thought I was progressing better than him, either in school or our military career path. For instance, when I became Head Boy at Bida Secondary School, Vatsa often made it a duty to put obstacles in my way as a leader. He frequently disregarded my instructions, insisting that there was nothing so special about being the Head Boy. That trend continued through our military career but tended to diminish as we both progressed in our respective military careers. Still, he was envious of my career path and postings up to when I was chosen as a member of the Supreme Military Council under General Murtala Muhammed.
“The investigations revealed the sordid details of the coup plan. There was a plan, for instance, to bomb strategic bridges in Lagos to cut off the Mainland from the Island and obstruct troop reinforcement from the Ikeja Cantonment to Bonny Camp on the Island. There were also plans to sabotage the air assets of the Air Force using the Makurdi air base. Other aspects included a plan to hijack or shoot down the president’s aircraft using air force combat aircraft. The multi-dimensional nature of the plan accounts for the heavy involvement of officers from the Air Force in the plans.
“Once the investigations were concluded and the panel reached its verdict, it was clear that the coup planners had to be executed. An allowance was made for appeals to the tribunal. Accordingly, those with only tangential involvement had their sentences commuted to life or other jail terms. There was no room to commute the sentences for Vatsa and the other core planners. Being intermediate and senior military officers, they were fully aware of the consequences of planning a coup and failing. That is one of the most elementary lessons every military officer knows by heart.
“Vatsa and his nine other co-conspirators were executed in March 1986. They had planned a bloody coup which would have plunged the country into darkness. I had to choose between saving a friend’s life and the nation’s future. Above all, everyone who had signed on to a military career understood clearly what it meant to plan a coup and fail. The penalty was clear and unmistakable.
“Of course, Vatsa’s death was a personal loss of a childhood friend. As a human being, I was somewhat depressed to watch him die in such circumstances. However, the nation’s stability and the cohesion of the armed forces were too high on the scale of priorities to be sacrificed for personal considerations. The law and the imperatives of order and national security are overriding.
“Given my closeness to General Vatsa and the political interpretations that emerged about his coup plot after his trial and execution, it is not surprising that agents of subsequent political dispensations tried to weaponise the Vatsa coup as a political tool against us in the post-1999 political ploys. Unfortunately, some members of the Vatsa family lent their voices and presence to these ploys, which fizzled out in due course.”
