Within a specified broad context, I was given the chance to formulate my presentation and I therefore elected to speak on the subject of “The Morning After Banditry: Reflections on Emerging Challenges to Hausa-Fulani Cultural Integration”, as an emergent but disturbing phenomenon in our communities. My focus will be on the noticeable increasing but insidious tendency for acrimonious trend of what sociologists and social psychologists call stereotyping and “othering” as a feature of inter-group relations between the Hausa and Fulbe ethnic groups in the Northwest Geopolitical zone in particular. This itself is also a direct outcome of the equally disturbing phenomenon of banditry and its increasing manifestation in Nigeria over the last fifteen years or so.
By Prof. Tukur Muhammad-Baba
Given the time limit imposed on my presentation, this paper will provide only a general sketch of my thoughts on the subject matter, starting with a clarification of my conception of the Hausa-Fulani Cultural Convergence.
“Hausa-Fulani” Cultural Convergence
The term “Hausa-Fulani” and its entry into popular vocabulary is traceable to a not-so-kind general political characterization of the people of northern Nigeria and, in particular, the Hausa and Fulani and Muslim ethnic groups, as made by the Lagos-Ibadan press (print and television). The term was invented to describe an amorphous but poorly delineated group perceived rightly or wrongly to exercise domineering influence on Nigerian politics, bureaucracy, and governance structures and processes, including the military and other security forces at the Federal levels. Such dominance is invariably seen to be to the detriment of others, especially, southern Nigerian groups. Although in linguistic terms different, the Hausa and Fulani ethnic were seen as indistinct, sharing similar cultural practices.
Beyond the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, the term became a preferred description of ethnic groups from the North that dress like and speak the Hausa language. But, this broad characterization was and is, not infrequently to the chagrin of hundreds of the other non-Hausa groups, even as they speak the Hausa language (or Fulfulde, the language of the Fulani), and retain distinct ethnocultural identities. As alluded to, such ethnic grounds abound in hundreds in the northern Nigerian geographical space and include such peoples as Nupe, Kanuri, Jukun, Bachama, Mumuye, Chamba, Zabarmawa, Tiv, Babur, Kambari, Igala, Gbagyi, Idoma, Igala, Ebira, Chibok, Marghi, and the many others, whether today Muslim, Christian or adherents of so-called traditional religions.
Beyond the politics of its application, however, I think that the term can indeed refer specifically to the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, as an indistinguishable cultural entity sharing a lot more in common in general outlook, living in the geographical north, sharing the same social characteristics (language, architecture, modes of dressing, religions whether as Christians, Muslims, traditionalists, and other habits). This is regardless of whether they are of the Hausa, Fulani, or any other ethnic group in the geography of the North.
I am, however, conscious and acutely aware and appreciative of the fact that the above description is highly simplistic, too broad, and perhaps far too general. Suffice it to say that the description is more aptly applied to areas where the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups constitute a distinct majority group as particularly found in the Northwest states of Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara in the main, as well as also in significant numbers in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Kogi, Niger states. In short, the reference to a “Hausa-Fulani” ethnic group speaks more to a sociolinguistic characterization of a hugely complex social geographic entity, with a human population today of perhaps up to 120 million; in actual reality composed of a mosaic of different ethnic groups, cultures, specific histories, religions, etc. The “entity” is thus united only by a general use of the Hausa language. Thus conceived, the geographical North of Nigeria can be said to have achieved a level of cultural integration of sorts with little distinctions between the peoples, as can be observed in residential neighbourhoods, markets, offices, schools, sports stadia, entertainments arena, hotels, motor parks, airports, ceremonies, public rallies and all manners of other gatherings, etc.
I therefore think that although northern ethnic groups retain their distinct identities and histories, in their different locations, the term “Hausa-Fulani” can be cautiously used to refer to the Hausa and Fulani groups that, more than others, achieved a higher degree of convergence in cultural outlook (at least in matters of religion, language, marriage and family structures and processes, language, political practices, and predominant economic pursuits, sharing a lot more in broad outlook than they do not.
Enter Banditry
In recent times, Northern Nigeria has been experiencing a spate of insecurity as detailed in my 2023 paper Rising Trend of Insecurity in Northern Nigeria, where I sketched out the contours of a state of insecurity that has since taken centre stage in the lives of communities. The insecurity is of two types, the first of which is criminality and anti-social behavior which have progressively become rampant and devastating in impact on the lives of people as well as social cohesion in communities. In these regards, religious extremism and mindless (largely rural) banditry, have together continued to ravage communities since about 2009 in different places with different but increasing intensity.
In the Northeast, Borno and Yobe states in particular, have been under siege by Boko Haram waging a brutal guerilla warfare seeking to establish an Islamic state on a puritanical, fundamentalist ideology. The second form of criminality, also of violent and brutal nature has been (armed) banditry and terrorism (with the North West Zone, and especially Zamfara State, as its epicenter). Both of these forms of criminal behaviours have received considerable attention in academic and non-academic literature.
Both forms have involved manifested in strategies and tools including kidnapping, assassinations, violent assaults, vandalization of public infrastructure, rape and other forms of sexual assaults, human rights violations, political thuggery, brutality by public security agents, etc., as well as conflicts between crop cultivators and animal herder conflicts, which often assume ethnic and religious colourations.
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As I stated, such criminality has involved hordes of lethal arms-bearing, motor cycle-riding bandits ransacking villages, waylaying travelers, pillaging stores and granaries, wantonly abducting girls and women (including the heavily pregnant), abduction of school children and students, mass shooting of people in sleepy-villages, arson, kidnapping for ransom, displacing settlements, preventing farmers from going to the fields, attacking miners at sites, and meting out other unimaginable and mind-boggling violence on humans and their property.
These criminal activities continue to lead to loss or disrupted livelihoods, exacerbate social inequalities, instigate deadly cycles of attacks and counter-attacks, population displacement, rise in internally displaced populations deaths, destruction, and disease, being meted out by thousands of bandits and militants, with billions of Naira in ransom payments, hundreds of hectares of land rendered uncultivable due to the menace of banditry and terrorism.
The other fact is, that the experience of banditry and extremism have been akin to a reign of terror, made worse, or are outright outcomes of existential economic conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and other deprivations which have been the lot of the people. According to the National Bureau of Statistics or NBS (2022), in its Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (MDPI) Report, 65% of the 133 million people living in multidimensional are northerners.
The Morning After Banditry
After years of ineffectiveness and a lot of dithering in the face of the rising dimension in the state of insecurity, it is now starting to look like new strategies to confront insecurity in northern Nigeria are bearing fruit with welcome evidence that the bandits are being tamed, losing steam or both.
In the northeast, despite sporadic and dramatic attacks in recent times, Boko Haram insurgents have largely neutralized as no longer do the terrorists hold territory as they did in the early part of the 2012 – 2019 period. In general, the same can be said about farmer-herder conflicts in Adamawa and Taraba states.
In the Northcentral region, despite episodes of the outbreak of attacks and counter-attacks, a sustained state of insecurity in Plateau and Benue has abated in the frequency of incidents or episodes.
In the Northwest zone, countermeasures by communities and state governments in places like Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara are, very cautiously speaking, looking promising in terms of taking the wind out of the life of banditry and terrorism.
Away from the cautious optimism, it must be emphasized that a lot more needs to be done. Many communities in Zamfara and Katsina, as well as in Benue, Kaduna, and Niger states, remain under significant siege. In short, a lot of damage has been done to lives, limbs, and property, with the human costs in particular very high. Simply, the behemoth of insecurity needs to be decapitated for good.
I will proceed to address only one of the many devastating outcomes of the reign of terror and banditry, and this has to do with the loss of trust within and between communities. This is an expected effect of conflict anywhere. Specific to the social-geographic North in general, a most disturbing outcome has been visible strains in relations between ethnic groups as they experience the different forms of insecurities and criminalities as these encroach on their relatively peaceful existence. For what remains of this presentation, I will turn to what appears to be the common culprit, for want of a better term, of the group seen responsible for perpetrating the mayhem, i.e. the pastoral Fulani.
It needs to be clarified here that the Fulani as a distinct ethnic entity is identifiable in two broad categories, the sedentary, a majority, largely urban and semi-urban but also rural who may and may not be pastoralists; these are the so-called “Fulanin gida” in the Hausa language or “Fulbe shi’e” in Fulfulde. The second category of the Fulani are those who have over time remained predominantly pastoral, rearing mostly cattle but also some small ruminants such as sheep and goats, who are largely transhumant and move across geographical zones between and within seasons in search of pasture and water as well as congenial social conditions.
Together, the two categories are perhaps the most widely dispersed ethnic group in a spread in Africa, although a minority in numbers, in 23-25 countries across the savannah and Sahel regions in the western, central, and other parts of Africa, from Guinea and the Sene-Gambia valley to Central Africa, Gabon the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
It also bears emphasizing that being a Phullo/Fullo (or Fulani) has been and remains a matter of cultural identification and affinity. Ethnicity is a social not biological attribute, many there are who may not, by antecedents or mixed parentage, but identify as such. Others may identify as Fulani, to claim the putative prestige of being seen as Fulani, especially because they adopted the the general characteristics of Fulani, speak Fulfulde, are pastoralists, and any other permutations.
In general, it has been the transhumant pastoral Fulani, often the Mbororo that have been seen to be or suspected of involvement in banditry. There is a historical context to the strained relations between the “Hausa” and “Fulani”, however, defined and as sketched below.
A History of Involvement in Struggles?
It has been my contention (Muhammad-Baba, 1990 (as I also intend to address the same in my forthcoming Inaugural Lecture) that although egregious, the current trend is not new and has to be understood in the context of historical antecedents as sketched in a little more detail below.
With regards to their immigration into the Hausa States (from about the 10th or 11th Century and up to the aftermath of the 1804 Jihad), the largely pastoral and transhumant Fulani, have not infrequently clashed, over access to land and water bodies, with the sedentary “Hausa” and other crop producers, as was the case in other areas generally east of the Hausa states of Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, etc., as well as Kanem Bornu. The gradual incursions of the pastoral Fulani in particular, was under mutual social suspicions. The pastoral Fulani had remained a minority, treated as irritants, and were marginalized, often at the mercy of communities who could expel them or otherwise impose stiff conditions for allowing them access to land and water. Distinctions between the transhumant and assimilated sedentary pastoralists were glaring, as each pursued different interests. In general, however, disputes over the resources were contained through negotiations for entry and other traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms.
In the aftermath of the 19th Century Sokoto Jihad, the pastoral Fulani enjoyed ascendency and became fully integrated within the rural agrarian political economy; they were no longer a marginal group and benefitted from the centralized political federation and achieved political integration. Inter-group relations enjoyed a boost through social engagements such as sedentarisation, cross-ethnic marriages, cultural diffusion, symbiotic farmer-herder cooperation, etc.
Based on Islamic ideals, assimilation between different ethnic groups was encouraged by the Jihad movement’s leadership. Integration of agrarian production systems was emphasized as did the Jihad leadership saw the potential for conflict between crop-cultivating populations and transhumant pastoralists. There was evidence that the pastoralists were at best ambivalent in their support for the Jihad movement and its leadership, shifting support by their opportunities for access to pasture and water resources as these presented themselves.
Perhaps counterintuitively, pastoralists were not in general Jihadists. The first Amirul Muminoon, Muhammad Bello saw the potential for such conflicts between the transhumant pastoralists and crop producers as well as between the pastoralists and the state. He thus called for measures to avert the outbreak of such conflicts through deliberate state policy of getting them to sedentarise.
I, therefore, think that events in the immediate post-Jihad period had significant moments when the entrenchment of some “Hausa-Fulani culture” (described above) took firm roots.
The advent of European colonialism returned the pastoralists to their erstwhile marginal status, this time under the capitalist conditions of the political economy as imposed by the invading imperialist forces. The pastoralists were not trusted by the colonialists as they, being transhuman, were seen to be unamenable to effective control as well as being suspected of harbouring solidarity with the ruling aristocracy established in the aftermath of the 1804 Jihad (largely of Fulani “extraction”, to use the vocabulary of the Ibadan Lagos press!), a significant number of whom fiercely resisted the imposition of European overlordship.
Indeed attempts were made to instigate Hausa commoners and the commercial class against the “Fulani rulers” with little success. The British, through colonial scholars like E. D. Morell (1911) and de St. Croix (1945), also tried to wedge a surreptitious racial divide between the Fulani and non-Fulani in the Empire by encouraging the former to see themselves as superior in race and intellect to the latter who were more negroid even as colonial “development” policy programmes tended to ignore the transhumant pastoralists
The current emerging trends of mutual animosities between the pastoral Fulani on the one hand and, on the other, the Hausa and the many other distinct ethnic groups therefore have long historical antecedents, including the legacy of the 1804 Jihad as well as the divide-and-rule policies of British (and French) past colonial masters.
Directly contributing to the current banditry, which began as the almost ubiquitous farmer vs herder conflicts, had been the fact that the herders have been predominantly of the transhumant pastoral Fulani stock, pitched against non-Fulani (Hausa, etc.) crop producers. This has been even though with time, the banditry has become a dark and deadly enterprise, involving a chain of actors of Fulani and non-Fulani ethnic colouration as informants, arms dealers, food vendors, and a myriad of other “supporting” human elements including rogue traditional leaders and religious clergy.
Thus, the banditry can be said to (i) involve disenfranchised and dispossessed pastoral Fulani victims of livestock rustling who take to criminality as an available “alternative”; and (ii) that the banditry has been most serious in rural areas, locations inhabited by people characterized by socioeconomic and political marginalization, poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, etc. Such social attributes tend to impose on people narrow worldviews, making them amenable to shallow and/or myopic interpretations of events and phenomena; easily given to perceiving and interpreting issues sensually and resorting to “othering” perceived enemies for real or imagined woes.
Other contributing factors to the unfortunate phenomenon include:
- A propensity for vengeance, against past acrimonious intergroup relations or clashes/encounters carried across;
- Corruption in public policy resource allocations including the dispensation of justice; other generalized corruption, failure to entrench the principles of good governance, economic development, employment opportunities, etc., which together as suffered by dispossessed Fulani victims of livestock rustling who take to criminality as available “alternative”;
- A fast-growing population with limited opportunities, given to economic idleness, poor business prospects, lack of capital/economic empowerment, rural-urban migration, etc; all of which combine to intensify competition for land and other scarce resources and government patronage;
- Changes in the socio-cultural environment through phenomena of urbanization, education, industrialization, etc., as traditional cultural practices are replaced by new forms. Such emerging social forces easily alienate people and make them amenable to scapegoating “others” not share similar primordial social characteristics;
- Elite expropriation and appropriation of the most productive lands leave marginalized peasants fighting over ever-dwindling quality lands, a problem exacerbated by climate change and environmental degradation;
- Manipulation, by political figures and other elites, of ethnoreligious differences for selfish political ends and economic advantages; and
- The increasing resort to unregulated vigilante and other non-state actors in law enforcement. Such informal non-state actors, expectedly, employ strong-arm mechanisms that end up muddling situations when they resort to dispensing justice too summarily and/or with impunity. Such groups are also easily captured by financial and political elites or other people with unwholesome agendas.
Possible Ways Out
The problem in question has no easy solution given the multiplicity of causal factors listed above. Granted that given the factors, there is indeed reason to be pessimistic. However, optimistic we must remain, as the current situation is mutually destructive and spells a looming atmosphere of societal anarchy or a state of anomie where conflict and criminality engulf every group to mutual disadvantage.
I would like to believe that in general the problem is not beyond redemption. There is, as observed, an already entrenched cultural convergence and cohesiveness in intergroup relations between non-Fulani (especially Hausas in the Northwest and other groups elsewhere) and Fulani pastoralists that has been in place for centuries. Social crises and conflicts can momentarily turn cultural convergence upside down. At the same time, because the convergence is deeply historically rooted, it will be hard to be up-ended or, in the event, can be easily re-established.
I do not claim to have the magic key to the sustainable resolution of the problem. Perhaps idealistically so, but I think that a satisfactory denouement to the unacceptable situation will depend foremost and very critically on several conditions, including:
Long-term, adequate, sincere, and sustained public policy response to all the causal factors. This is perhaps a tall order as a project but there is no way out;
In the short term, deliberate and carefully calibrated policy intervention involving policymakers, traditional leaders, and the religious clergy to convince communities of the need to eschew violence and divisiveness, actively accept cooperation, tolerance, embrace social inclusivity, diversity, pluralism, and peaceful co-existence;
Modernization of agricultural production practices including both crop production and animal rearing. Current practices for both crop producers and animal rearers are outdated, inefficient ineffective, and unlikely to guarantee enough to support the population;
Implementation of grassroots policy projects of adult and non-formal education with a specific focus on skills acquisition and the promotion of modern small-scale and medium enterprise management skills;
Declaration of a state of emergency on education with transparent allocation of resources at the state and local government levels;
Inclusion of conflict resolution and peace education in the curriculum of basic educational institutions;
Inclusion of all ethnicities in the recruitment, training, and deployment of complementary security outfits is now being embarked upon by states, however called; and
Intensified support for the security forces so that their efforts to restore peace can be achieved. However, the security forces must be tasked to produce deliverables within stipulated deadlines. The war against banditry and terrorism cannot and should not be an open-ended endeavour.
I thank you most graciously for listening.
Being Talking Points Presented at the Opening Session of the Congress of the Sokoto State Chapter of the Nigerian Union of Journalists, held at the Press Centre, Zuru Road, on Saturday, March 30th, 2024) by Prof. Muhammad-Baba of the Department of Sociology of the Federal University Birnin Kebbi, Birnin Kebbi, Nigeria
